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A B S T R A C T
The transition towards low-energy buildings in the United Kingdom is challenging. Several policy changes have
aﬀected the actions and agency of actors. Drawing on the sustainability transitions literature, we analyse the
development of the low-energy homes niche, focusing on the dynamics between intermediary organisations and
policy development for low-energy homes. Based on rich interview and secondary data, we note how the ex-
istence and activities of transition intermediaries are enabled or curtailed by policy changes. We identify niche
development phases along with the position and activities of intermediary organisations. In the predevelopment
phase, non-state transition intermediaries have formed when government policy has been weak or market-based.
During take-oﬀ, targeted policy initiatives have created protective spaces and stimulated the emergence of new
intermediaries aiming to consolidate the niche. State-aﬃliated intermediaries have been established as part of
active energy eﬃciency policy, but later ceased to exist or became privatised. Existing organisations have
adopted intermediary functions to advance low-energy homes in response to policy. Furthermore, intermediaries
have on occasion inﬂuenced policy development, often through cooperation among an ecology of inter-
mediaries. In conclusion, we raise questions regarding intermediaries in the changing governance context.
1. Introduction
International oil crises of the 1970s led to oﬃcial building energy
eﬃciency policy in many countries, paving a way towards low-energy
buildings. Yet, the existing building stock still today contributes a sig-
niﬁcant share of carbon dioxide emissions globally, and the transition
to low-energy buildings has not progressed very far.
The ﬁeld is abound with barriers for the adoption of system in-
novations that would signiﬁcantly reduce energy demand from build-
ings [1,[2]]. Despite new strategies to overcome barriers [2] and the
long-established sustainable buildings niche [3,4], the UK transition
(largely dependent on energy eﬃciency policy to stimulate change) is
very slow.
We focus on the development towards low-energy residential
buildings (from here on referred to as ‘low-energy homes’)1 in the
United Kingdom (UK). UK is a country with an active climate policy
community involving central government actors, policy makers and
non-governmental organisations [5]. A considerable sustainable
housing movement has developed in the last 30–40 years, promoting
concepts such as ‘autonomous homes’, ‘eco-homes’, ‘sustainable homes’,
‘low-carbon homes’ and ‘passive houses’ (e.g. [6,7]). While this move-
ment has pioneered new ideas and practices, many of their innovations
have not diﬀused widely [4]. This movement forms a backdrop to to-
day’s low-energy homes niche in the UK.
Empirically, the low-energy homes niche consists of diﬀerent
strands and conceptualisations as noted above. Over time, it has bran-
ched into new directions (cf. [8]). Yet, the developments can be seen to
form a broader low-energy homes niche due to the niche actors’ similar
aims to break free from the existing set of building rules, the inter-
relations between the actors across new and existing buildings, and the
build-up of activities beneﬁtting policy development.
During the last four decades, intermediary organisations have
formed to advance innovative projects, create a protective space for
their diﬀusion, and to lobby or implement new policies for low-energy
homes. We explore the dynamics of such ‘transition intermediaries’
operating to advance sustainable sociotechnical change through policy
development.
Transition intermediaries serve systemic functions, including the
facilitation of multi-actor innovation networks, linking demand and
supply side for disruptive innovation, and connecting niche innovators
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to ﬁnancial and human resources [9]. Such intermediaries may inﬂu-
ence transitions by “disturbing existing structures, practices and beha-
viours”, through actively facilitating niche development and/or through
aiming to destabilise the dominant technological, institutional and
market regimes ([10]: 1371).
We aim to ﬁll a gap in the transitions literature regarding how the
emergence and activities of transition intermediaries link to national
policy change. Rather than focusing on speciﬁc intermediary actors, we
trace the low-energy homes niche and policy development in the UK,
identifying how multiple intermediaries across the new build and ret-
roﬁt sectors change and interact with policy over time.
We also aim to unwrap the concept of ‘dynamic ecology of inter-
mediaries’ [11] empirically in the context of niche and policy devel-
opment. Kivimaa et al. ([9]: 5) described an ‘ecology of intermediaries’
as speciﬁc intermediaries having diﬀering competences, remits, and
operational models that “complement but also compete with each other,
forming interdependencies and overlaps, sometimes also leaving gaps vis-à-
vis a given innovation process or system”.
Empirically, we explore:
• When and why, during niche development, have new intermediary
organisations emerged or existing organisations subsumed roles for
low-energy homes vis-à-vis policy change?
• How has this ‘ecology of intermediaries’ changed over time?
• How have the intermediary organisations inﬂuenced policy devel-
opment for low-energy homes?
A backdrop for this analysis is the development of UK low-energy
homes policy for new and existing building stock. New build was in-
ﬂuenced by a zero-carbon homes agenda taking-oﬀ from 2006 onwards
and slowing down from 2009, involving a complete policy overhaul in
2015.
We draw on theoretical concepts from the sustainability transitions
literature, including phases of transitions [12,13] and niche develop-
ment [8,14]. We present novel empirical insights, and note how policy
change can enable or curtail a dynamic ecology of intermediaries. Our
study also shows, importantly, that niche development does not ne-
cessarily scale-up but may also weaken after take-oﬀ.
We draw on 29 interviews conducted during 2014–2018 and use
academic and grey literature to build a description of the UK low-en-
ergy homes niche and related policy development during 1970–2016.
Section 2 introduces the theoretical concepts informing our ana-
lysis. Section 3 describes the methods. Section 4 starts by focussing on
how diﬀerent policy phases form sub-phases in the broader phases of
niche development for low-energy homes, providing a brief historical
description. It then moves onto a novel analysis pertaining to the
emergence of intermediary organisations, their changing roles and their
inﬂuence on the policies supporting niche development. Section 5 dis-
cusses and concludes.
2. Conceptual setting: niches, phases and intermediaries in
transitions
2.1. Niche development
Niches are spaces where networks of actors experiment with more
environmentally sustainable organisational forms and technologies [6].
While a niche originally forms around a speciﬁc (often technological)
innovation, a process of niche branching can follow, containing sub-
sequent niches, e.g., new application domains, formation of market
niches, or niche replication [8]. White and Stirling ([15]: 839) note that
“‘niche’ is not objectively empirically ﬁxed in any given setting, but depends
heuristically on the purpose and level of analysis”.
Multiple projects are seen to form a technological trajectory, and
produce generic lessons and shared cognitive rules through dedicated
aggregation activities [16]. Actors sharing similar aims coalesce and
construct narratives to draw attention and material resources for ad-
vancing the niche [17]. Intermediary actors may become crucial in
aggregating lessons, connecting actors and forming narratives. Niches
can be protected through support from suppliers, users and public
policy, the latter including, for example, subsidies and favourable
treatment in legal frameworks [17].
Prevailing socio-technical regimes consist of dominating technolo-
gies, institutions, practices and cultural norms [18], ‘against’ which
niches have to perform [19]. Overarching, long-term landscape devel-
opments, e.g., political trends, environmental changes or wars [18]
create pressure on regimes, providing opportunities for new niches
[14].
2.2. Phases of transitions and niche development
The literature describes phases of transitions as predevelopment and
exploration, take-oﬀ, acceleration, and stabilisation [12,13]. As these
are broad for analysing the intricacies of niche development, we also
draw on niche development studies. Rotmans et al. [12] describe how
the concept of ‘transition’ can be applied at diﬀerent levels of ag-
gregation (companies, sectors, countries, regions), developments of
which can be followed over time and compared to each other.
The predevelopment phase is depicted as a dynamic equilibrium,
where no visible changes can be observed to status quo [12], and it
involves small-scale, temporary experimentation [13]. Rotmans et al.
[12] note that transitions may appear fast even when the predevelop-
ment phase is long, and the take-oﬀ phase remains largely unnoticed.
Yet, take-oﬀ is more visible [12], illustrated by the build-up of novel
solutions [13]. During take-oﬀ, niche development advances from in-
dividual experiments to strategic actions that aggregate experiments,
build agendas and create temporary protective spaces for the niche;
partly enabled by policies such as R&D or deployment support schemes
[20]. During take-oﬀ, the niche is expected to face signiﬁcant opposi-
tion from regime actors.
In both predevelopment and take-oﬀ phases, niches beneﬁt from
shielding processes (e.g. the creation of support and funding schemes)
that create protected space away from mainstream selection environ-
ments [20]. In both phases, nurturing also takes place, consisting of
three processes: articulation of expectations and visions by piloting new
concepts, lobbying for change, and creating new standards; creating a
space for learning by providing education, advice and aggregated
knowledge from experiments; and connecting actors by creating net-
works and pooling resources [20].
In the acceleration phase, niches become more established, and the
developed technological or social innovations diﬀuse more widely,
starting to compete in mainstream markets and with the incumbent
regime [21]. The niche becomes competitive within mainstream socio-
technical practices (ﬁt-and-conform) or is coupled with institutional
reforms and re-structured regimes that make the mainstream market
favourable to niche innovations (stretch-and-transform) [20]. Struc-
tural changes become noticeable through a build-up of socio-cultural,
economic, ecological and institutional modiﬁcations [12,13].
In the stabilisation phase, a former niche has become the new re-
gime [21].
Safarzynska et al. [13] note how the notion of a multi-phase tran-
sitions directs attention into the timing of (policy) interventions to steer
transitions. They draw on an example from Zundel et al. [86] how
during stabilisation and early predevelopment, investments into a di-
versity of promising solutions would be useful to increase the scope of
learning. In later transition phases, if the transition path is unstable,
implementation of destabilising policies, such as environmental taxes or
tradable permits and withdrawing political support for old technolo-
gical solutions may be needed [13]. Yet, such ‘unlocking’ of policies
does not happen self-evidently and can be extremely diﬃcult [13,87].
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2.3. Transition intermediaries
An emerging literature on transition intermediaries, originated by
van Lente et al. [22] and Geels and Deuten [23], focuses on actors (and
platforms) that intermediate between production and consumption,
learning and its utilisation, and/or a range of other actors with the
intention to facilitate and speed-up sustainability transitions. Empiri-
cally, the literature describes examples in which such intermediation
may occur (a) between actors, e.g., building new networks to support
niche development, or (b) between activities, e.g., aggregating experi-
ences and learning from pilot projects to inform policymaking, and
connecting processes of learning to the articulation of expectations.
The literature on transition intermediaries has focused on niche
development (e.g. [24,15]) and urban transitions (e.g. [25–27]), with
less attention paid to the destabilisation of existing regimes [28].
Scholars have examined how speciﬁc actors act as intermediaries, and
longitudinal analyses regarding multiple intermediaries are rare.
Parag and Janda’s ([29]: 104) illustration of intermediary actors ﬁts
well for our study: “formal and informal government and semi-government
energy agencies, NGOs, agencies and organisations sponsored by utilities,
energy services companies and providers (ESCOs),… local communities,
grassroots and networking platforms,… research and technology organisa-
tions, chambers of commerce, innovation centers, industry associations and
partnerships”. However, we do not perceive all such organisations au-
tomatically as intermediaries, but instead make our assessment based
on their activities (in this case on advancing transition towards low-
energy homes). Kivimaa [10] notes the varying nature of intermedia-
tion in organisations by pointing out that not all activities of a speciﬁc
organisation relate to intermediation, describing intermediary organi-
sations to have a high focus on, or a high proportion of, activities in-
volving intermediation.
While the conceptualisation of knowledge brokers (e.g. [30]) and
innovation intermediaries (e.g. [31,11]) apply also to transition inter-
mediaries, the latter take broader systemic roles. For example, knowl-
edge brokers do not extend their activities to strategic visioning and
political manoeuvring using the presentation and interaction of dif-
ferent information and evidence [32], which can be regarded a tran-
sition intermediary role.
We pay speciﬁc attention to intermediary organisations engaged in
policymaking processes, e.g. by attempting to inﬂuence policy through
a lens of transitioning and/or by being established because of policy-
making. Drawing inspiration from Moss [33], we examine how inter-
mediary organisations come into being vis-a-vis policy development.
3. Method
We undertook a qualitative case study analysis (cf. [34]) completed
during a large research programme in 2014–2018. The development of
UK low-energy homes provided an interesting case due to the UK’s long
history of sustainable housing movements (cf. [4]) and ambitious cli-
mate policy objectives. Yet, the number of low-energy homes (existing
and new build) has remained small.
We combined in-depth interviews with academic and grey literature
to build an understanding of policy development, niche development
and intermediary organisations. Twenty-nine stakeholder interviews
(16 in person, 13 by phone, all digitally recorded) were completed in
three rounds (Table 1). First ten interviews gathered information on
policy development, with interviewees chosen based on their expertise
regarding low-energy homes policy.
The second set of interviews focused on developments in low-energy
homes from the perspective of diﬀerent organisations with potential to
act as intermediary actors. The selection was based on authors’ prior
knowledge in the ﬁeld, document and website analysis, and snowbal-
ling.
Alongside interviews, we collected information on 75 organisations
active in the low-energy homes sector via an internet search and Ta
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compiled information on their history, remit and activities, identifying
potential intermediaries. Academic and grey literature provided in-
sights on the identiﬁed key intermediaries, their emergence and policy
inﬂuence. Fig. 1 illustrates diﬀerent types of intermediary organisations
operating in the low-energy homes context and their core character-
istics.
We created a 15,000-word narrative of the UK low-energy homes
niche, highlighting key intermediaries (not all 75 identiﬁed) based on
the interview and document analysis. Two authors coded the narrative
document and identiﬁed key phases of niche and policy development in
relation to landscape pressures, regime-level policy developments, and
the emergence of intermediary actors and their position.
To strengthen our initial ﬁndings on intermediaries’ inﬂuence on
policy development, we conducted a third round of interviews in May
2017 and February–March 2018 with long-term experts in the UK low-
energy homes sector. We refer to interviews as I1-29 in the following
sections.
4. Findings
Section 4.1 presents a summary of 45 years of policy and niche
development for low-energy homes. From our initial historical narra-
tive, we identiﬁed nine phases related to policy development, which
constituted sub-phases to the broader transition phases of predevelop-
ment, take-oﬀ and gradual backtracking (see Appendix A). Section 4.2
illustrates our ﬁndings regarding the dynamics of intermediary emer-
gence with policy development. Section 4.3 illustrates examples how
the intermediaries have inﬂuenced policy development.
4.1. Niche-regime development in UK low-energy buildings: a summary of
phases
4.1.1. 1970–1998: predevelopment
The ﬁrst two decades since the ﬁrst oil crisis in 1973 fall under
predevelopment, containing ﬁve policy sub-phases:
1 1970–1978: Oil crises, initiation of active energy eﬃciency policy
and pioneers of alternative, sustainable housing emerge
2 1979–1982: Economics of energy and rational choice dominate, but
also inﬂuence the emergence of new intermediaries for low-energy
homes
3 1983–1986: Come back of strong energy eﬃciency agenda and
large-scale pilots
4 1987–1990: Free market and information approach to energy eﬃ-
ciency, and non-state intermediaries lobbying for stronger policy
5 1991–1998: Climate change concerns, mainstreaming energy eﬃ-
ciency in building assessment, and ﬁrst steps towards passive house
and zero-carbon designs
During early predevelopment (1970–1978), emerging policy atten-
tion focused on reducing building energy demand. In 1973, signiﬁcant
increases in oil prices led to the creation of the ﬁrst Department of
Energy2 and a rethink about energy eﬃciency [35]. Regarding the ex-
isting building stock, a ‘Save It’ energy saving campaign was launched
in 1975, and a government run energy eﬃciency programme in 1977
which included a 10-year insulation programme [36]. In 1976, Part
Fig. 1. Intermediary organisations in niche development for low-energy homes.
2 See Mallaburn and Eyre [36] for details regarding subsequent changes in government
departments.
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L1A ‘Conservation of Fuel and Power in New Dwellings’ was introduced
to building regulations addressing, for the ﬁrst time, energy consump-
tion in new buildings [37], and setting a trajectory towards new low-
energy homes (I2). The ﬁrst requirements for energy eﬃciency in
building regulations were modest (I25), but they were regarded as an
extremely interventionist government approach [36] and indicated the
dire impacts of the oil price shocks on the economy.
Locally, environmentally motivated individuals and groups devel-
oping new eco-eﬃcient, solar or autonomous homes emerged (e.g. [3]).
Government support for experimentation was incremental and piece-
meal.
Early policy activity soon halted through a new Conservative gov-
ernment in 1979, who believed that energy prices were suﬃcient to
reduce demand. This initiated a second sub-phase under predevelop-
ment (1979–1982). New non-state actors emerged with concern about
the existing building stock. They piloted and lobbied to continue reg-
ulation on energy eﬃciency.
The third sub-phase (1983–1986) saw the return of energy eﬃ-
ciency policy. In 1983, the Conservative government appointed Peter
Walker as Energy Secretary who became a “political heavyweight cham-
pion of energy eﬃciency” [35]. “Over a little more than two years 20,000
people came to energy management meetings hosted by Ministers and senior
oﬃcials” ([36]: 26). Walker led the development of energy eﬃciency
policy “from something quite stagnant to eye-catching” (I25).
Regional energy eﬃciency oﬃces and best practice guidelines were
established, Part L of the building regulations tightened, and 1986 was
announced an ‘Energy Eﬃciency Year’ together with a ‘Get More for
your Monergy’ national energy eﬃciency campaign [36]. Milton
Keynes ‘garden city’3 became a research hub for sustainable buildings
[38] and 53 innovative low-energy and solar homes developed by 33
companies were displayed [39]. These developments addressed both
new build and retroﬁt.
During a fourth sub-phase (1987–1990), a third Conservative gov-
ernment returned to a free-market based approach, leading to cuts in
energy eﬃciency budgets, demonstration initiatives and subsidies [36].
New actors emerged to promote sustainable construction, deliver low-
energy projects for new and existing buildings, and advocate higher
energy eﬃciency standards.
During late predevelopment (1991–1998), the 1994 United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change and European Union
Directives on appliances and gas boilers created new landscape pres-
sures resulting in the beginning of take-oﬀ in the low-energy homes
niche. While the government continued its market-led approach,
building regulations were tightened further. The government also in-
troduced requirements for local authorities to draft a strategy for im-
proving residential energy eﬃciency and report on measures regarding
new and existing buildings through the Home Energy Conservation Act
[40,36].
On the ground, concrete developments were not yet visible beyond
individual pilots, and fell under predevelopment. Yet, local experi-
mentation resulted in two separate home energy labelling schemes: the
National Home Energy Rating (NHER) based on the Milton Keynes
experiments [41] and Starpoint, which was a much simpler calculation
([42]; I25). Committed individuals continued pioneering projects.
4.1.2. 1999–2008: take-oﬀ
Take-oﬀ contains two policy sub-phases:
6 1999-2005: International climate commitments and active vision
building for low-energy homes (nurturing)
7 2006-2008: A zero-carbon commitment and time of action
(shielding), shadowed by the global ﬁnancial crash
Early take-oﬀ (1999–2005), pertaining to a vision of zero-carbon
homes, begun through vision building inﬂuenced by international and
national commitments to reduce emissions. Internationally, the
2002 EU Directive on the energy performance of buildings set minimum
standards for new buildings and existing buildings subject to major
renovation,4 paving the way towards “nearly zero-energy” announced
much later, in 2010, by the European Commission.
New networks and high-proﬁle projects generated practical and
policy learning [43], many state and non-state intermediaries being
active. New policy measures included the Decent Homes Standard for
energy performance in social housing, Warm Homes and Energy Con-
servation Act 2000 addressing fuel poverty, the Energy White Paper
2003 (a ﬁrst energy policy statement in 20 years), integration of EU
requirements concerning new build into building regulations, and
subsequent Energy Eﬃciency Action Plans [36].
While new build received more attention, measures to install in-
sulation and more eﬃcient windows and boilers addressed existing
buildings. The Utilities Act 2000 gave powers to the government, in-
stead of the regulator Ofgem, to set energy saving targets for supplier
obligations ([44]; I26). Energy utilities implemented these through
subsidising insulation, low-energy lighting and more eﬃcient appli-
ances [44]. Some regard this to date as “the biggest energy eﬃciency
policy in terms of carbon and energy savings with the possible exception of
the condensing boiler regulation in 2005”, leading to a signiﬁcant volume
of supplier obligations carried out during 2002–2008 (I26). Demon-
stration programmes for small-scale renewables at the household and
neighbourhood level were introduced in 2002 [45].
Active shielding followed during late take-oﬀ (2006–2008), in-
cluding substantial policy commitments: the 2006 announcement to-
wards zero-carbon new homes and the 2008 Climate Change Act. The
zero carbon homes announcement was “very ground breaking…back then
the atmosphere was very diﬀerent, everyone was really excited” (I7). “With
zero carbon, it was an understanding from the [previous] government
[Labour] that something signiﬁcant needed to change” (I2). Concerning
new build, the Labour government implemented a voluntary Code for
Sustainable Homes, tightened building regulations and set-up an in-
dustry-government body to address the delivery of new zero-carbon
homes. While the house-building industry preferred voluntary policy
approaches, it could not prevent the change of building regulations in
accordance with the zero-carbon target [45].
Energy eﬃciency policy was placed in a new Department of Energy
and Climate Change (DECC) in 2008. The zero-carbon homes an-
nouncement spurred action on the ground and new intermediary or-
ganisations and networks formed.
4.1.3. 2009–2016: backtracking phase
The backtracking phase comprises two policy sub-phases:
8 2009-2014: Gradual dismantling of government zero-carbon as-
piration, while piloting continues; government austerity measures
9 2015-2016: U-turn in government low-energy homes policy and
decreasing on-the-ground activity
During 2009–2014, take-oﬀ continued in many respects. Gradually
diluting policies, however, weakened the protective space. The 2008
global ﬁnancial crash led to a recession in the UK, resulting in gov-
ernment induced austerity measures and de-prioritisation of climate
change [5]. The recession slowed down house building and inﬂuenced
the availability of mortgages [46], resulting in debates on housing af-
fordability [47].3 Milton Keynes was one of UK 28 towns set-up in the 1960s, inspired by Sir Ebenezer
Howard's garden cities movement [78] to create places combining town and country
living, green space, community landownership and job opportunities [78]. These new
cities provided opportunities to develop new large scale housing concepts [39]. 4 In the UK, the minimum standards for existing buildings were not implemented [79].
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A Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government elected in
2010 diluted the zero-carbon deﬁnition (I8) and changed the landscape
for energy eﬃciency signiﬁcantly (I28). Only a limited number of trials
met the zero-carbon homes standards (I2). Many policies constituting
protective space for new and existing low-energy homes were removed
in 2015, before acceleration was reached. In 2016, the UK voted to
leave the EU, adding further uncertainty. Many non-state inter-
mediaries actively lobbied to reintroduce the low-energy homes policy.
4.1.4. 2017: uncertain future ahead
During the last 45 years, multiple policies and actors (e.g. aca-
demics, businesses, government departments, local authority organi-
sations, NGOs and trade bodies) have been a part of the low-energy
homes niche. Over time, new networks have emerged and intermediary
actors have brought diﬀerent organisations together and facilitated the
delivery of low-energy homes.
In 2017, the number of new low-energy homes remained low. The
Low Energy Buildings Database5 listed 212 projects that had achieved
at least a 70% reduction in primary energy and CO2 emissions. New
momentum may, however, be created by the ambitions in the new In-
dustrial Strategy launched at the end of 2017 [48]. The Strategy aims to
build a market for energy eﬃciency among homeowners and transform
construction with better integration of energy eﬃciency and digital
technologies [49].
4.2. Dynamics of transition intermediaries and policy development
Based on our analysis of the dynamics between intermediation and
policy development, we make the following observations: (1) non-state
transition intermediaries formed especially when government policy
was weak or market-based; (2) state-aﬃliated intermediaries were set
up during active low-energy homes policy; (3) existing organisations
adopted intermediary-functions to advance low-energy homes in re-
sponse to policy; and (4) intermediaries ceased to exist or change roles.
In the following, we illustrate each of these ﬁndings empirically. Fig. 2
gives an overview of the phases vis-à-vis the establishment of new in-
termediary organisations or roles, addressed in more detail below.
4.2.1. Emergence of non-state transition intermediaries
Non-state ‘voluntary’ intermediaries speciﬁcally emerged at times of
weak or market-based policy in the 1970s and 1980s, during pre-
development, to lobby in direct response to a lack of strong policy, or to
initiate local action that went beyond existing policy requirements.
While the intermediaries engaged more in either new or existing
buildings, late predevelopment in particular saw the emergence of actors
driving changes in the existing building stock.
Centre for Alternative Technology (CAT) and the Centre for
Sustainable Energy (CSE) were established to initiate local action. CAT
started in 1973 in Wales as a self-suﬃcient community aiming to pro-
vide autonomous eco-housing concepts [91] and resource eﬃcient
living [43] contributing in the new build sector. Its pilots and experi-
ments are widely known, inﬂuencing today’s low-energy housing
community (I27, I28; [50]).
CAT’s sister organisation CSE was created in 1979 in Bristol, to
undertake retroﬁt demonstration projects locally. Its work has involved
“energy advice to the public and trying to take advantage of the policy
programmes that are out there to develop local insulation schemes” (I15).
Over time, CSE’s role expanded to a wide range of activities (I27) and
national-level reach in education, advice, campaigns and policy ana-
lysis ([51]; I15). CSE’s particular interest has been in “trying things out
and feeding learning into policymaking or practice by others” (I15).
The Association for the Conservation of Energy (ACE) and National
Energy Action (NEA) emerged in 1981, during predevelopment. ACE was
established as an energy eﬃciency campaigning, research and lobbying
organisation (I8) by 20 insulation companies (I15) active in the energy
conservation industry [52]. It aimed to inﬂuence government policy to
ensure continued regulation for residential energy eﬃciency in existing
buildings, transmitting the views of its members (I8, I27). While ACE
has worked in the interests of its members, it has also tried to advance
energy conservation more broadly (I25, I28).
NEA was set up as ‘Neighbourhood Energy Action’ (later titled
National Energy Action), an initiative by a group of university students
who installed loft insulation for elderly people ([53]; I24). Initially, it
was an incremental rather than a transitions actor and had no institu-
tional backing (I24). However, NEA became a national charity cam-
paigning to increase domestic energy eﬃciency [53] and one of the
most inﬂuential organisations addressing fuel poverty (I27).
Later in predevelopment, when a market-approach being the best in
delivering energy eﬃciency returned to dominate political beliefs (cf.
[54]), new non-state intermediary organisations were established to
promote low-energy new build (while also carrying activities sup-
porting retroﬁt). These included the Association for Environment
Conscious Building (AECB) in 1989 and the National Energy Founda-
tion (NEF) in 1990. AECB is a network of builders, architects and en-
gineers. It has had close involvement in policy processes, advocating for
higher energy eﬃciency standards and an absolute approach for mea-
suring building energy performance [55]. ACEB has been inﬂuential as
pioneers (I27).
NEF was established as an independent charity to take forward some
initiatives initially undertaken by the Milton Keynes Development
Corporation (MKDC) [56], a government agency set up to develop a
new city area. NEF’s key activities were to deliver practical projects,
inspire new low-energy building, advance knowledge and address
market failures [41]. It has also recommended installers for low-energy
and zero-carbon solutions [57] and lobbied the government to adopt a
home energy rating system (I25, I29).
During late take-oﬀ, new intermediaries were again set-up. In 2006,
the Good Homes Alliance (GHA) was established as a member organi-
sation comprising housing developers, building industry and sustain-
ability professionals promoting new sustainable homes [58]. It de-
scribes itself as a pressure and industry representative group, while
being implicitly critical about current industrial systems in place as
these are not delivering good quality homes (I22).
The UK Green Building Council (UKGBC) was established in 2007 to
“oﬀer clarity, cohesion and leadership to a disparate sector, and to campaign
for a sustainable built environment” [59]. Its initiator and then Chief
Executive had previously led a WWF sustainable homes campaign (I7).
UKGBC also had the backing of mainstream Home Builders Federation
[45]. Its aims included promoting sustainable building, inﬂuencing
government policy, creating standards for new products, developing
technical knowledge, and training [45]. It became one of key actors for
the sustainable housing sector (I28), engaging with ministers and policy
makers at the highest level (I5).
The new intermediaries emerging after signiﬁcant policy an-
nouncements can be seen as a response to policy increasingly creating
‘protective space’. This, in turn, allowed the intermediaries themselves
to retain and recreate that space and provide nurturing for the niche.
The new network-type intermediaries also represented a way to orga-
nise the disparate eﬀorts to form a more coherent niche to respond to
the changing policy environment, well evident in, for example, the aims
of UKGBC.
4.2.2. State-aﬃliated transition intermediaries established in times of most
active energy eﬃciency policy
Several state-initiated intermediaries have advanced the low-energy
homes niche; the ﬁrst established in early predevelopment in the 1970s.
The Department of Energy created an Advisory Council on Energy
Conservation (ACEC) in 1974 to ﬁll a gap in energy demand expertise
5 Low Energy Buildings Database: http://www.lowenergybuildings.org.uk (Accessed
14 May 2017).
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across sectors. ACEC was formed of engineers, energy supply industry
representatives, energy consumers, a federation of trade unions, and
academics, and it advised the Secretary of State for Energy [60].
The government did not establish new low-energy intermediaries
until the 1990s, in late predevelopment, an era when climate change
concerns became visible. Connected to the formalisation of UK climate
policy [61], the government established the Energy Saving Trust (EST)
in 1993 to focus particularly on household energy saving in the existing
building stock. EST’s roles were at the time to promote energy eﬃ-
ciency via advice and information campaigns and to manage grant
schemes [45]. EST contracted NEF to manage a network of 30 Energy
Advice Centres providing information on home energy eﬃciency [41].
In 2000, EST contributed to the establishment of a government-funded
network intermediary Energy Eﬃciency Partnership for Homes, per-
ceived as important for cooperation and dialogue (I27, I29). EST acted
as an important intermediary for policy advice and implementation
during take-oﬀ, particularly until it was detached from the government
in England and Wales (but not in Scotland) in 2010 [36], at the start of
the backtracking phase.
During late take-oﬀ, in 2008, and following the zero-carbon homes
announcement of 2006, the government, together with industry, set up
the Zero Carbon Hub (ZCH). ZCH, a not-for-proﬁt organisation, brought
together key stakeholders to develop a framework for the delivery of
new zero-carbon homes [62]. ZCH, initially part-funded by govern-
ment, convened industry experts and government partners to undertake
research on the technical and economic feasibility of the zero-carbon
homes target [62]. It established a speciﬁc Timeline Group in 2009 with
the objective to “carefully consider those factors which are enabling and
assisting the journey to meet the 2016 Zero Carbon trajectory and also to
consider the road blocks and concerns that are aﬀecting this objective” [63].
Members of the group included industry, trade associations and NGOs
(e.g. intermediary organisations EST, UKGBC and WWF) [64] and the
group reported directly to the ‘2016 Task Force’ set up by Yvette
Cooper, the Minister of Housing and Planning [64].
During backtracking, in 2012, the government still set-up a new
Energy Eﬃciency Deployment Oﬃce (EEDO) within DECC to deliver a
new energy eﬃciency strategy that year [36].
Beyond the low-energy homes focused intermediaries, during take-
oﬀ, Friends of the Earth lobbied for a Climate Change Act (I26), which
became law in 2008. The Act established an independent Committee on
Climate Change (CCC) that continues to monitor and advise on the
delivery of carbon budgets [36].
4.2.3. Existing organisations subsuming transition intermediary roles
Frequently, intermediation occurs by established organisations
adopting intermediary roles in a new sector (e.g. [33]). This is evident
for state-aﬃliated and non-state intermediaries advancing the UK low-
energy homes niche.
In the 1970s, during early predevelopment, energy eﬃciency became
a focus for existing government organisations. The Energy Technology
Division in the Department of Energy was renamed the Energy
Conservation Unit (ECU) in 1977 by Labour Energy Secretary Tony
Benn, bringing energy demand on par with energy supply in policy-
making [36]. In 1983, during third sub-phase of predevelopment, a new
Energy Secretary, Peter Walker, renamed ECU as the Energy Eﬃciency
Oﬃce (EEO) that produced a range of Best Practice guides on energy
use in dwellings “to persuade builders, householders and landlords to im-
prove the energy eﬃciency of properties” ([65]: 310). Also, MKDC estab-
lished an Energy Consultative Unit in 1976 [66].
An Energy Conservation Unit (BRECSU) was set-up under Building
Research Establishment (BRE) during early predevelopment in 1978, in-
itiating a period of BRE becoming active in advancing energy eﬃciency.
BRE was initially created in 1972 by merging three government-funded
research laboratories [67]. It operated mainly as a technical organisa-
tion between the research community, practitioners and sector profes-
sionals (I13). However, BRE became “less inﬂuenced by industrial re-
quirements and progressively more aligned to the support of Government
needs” through a “’customer-contractor’ relationship in Departmental re-
search funding” ([67]: 287). “Energy and environmental… work received
new emphasis in the next decade, with a large programme promoting energy
eﬃciency in the building sector that grew from small beginnings in the mid-
1980s to employ around 70 staﬀ by 1993” ([67]: 287).
During early backtracking, to comprehensively address the energy
performance of existing buildings, the government and the social
Fig. 2. Niche development and policy phases, with key intermediaries over time.
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housing sector jointly set up Retroﬁt for the Future, a £17 million
programme funded by the government’s Technology Strategy Board
(now InnovateUK) in 2009–2013 [68]. It took a whole house approach
to retroﬁtting social housing, with an aim to reduce CO2 emissions by
80% [68].
Environmental NGOs have sometimes acted as temporary transition
intermediaries [69] to lobby advances in low-energy homes policy. In
the late-1980s, Friends of the Earth ran a national campaign for the
development of mandatory supplier obligations around domestic en-
ergy eﬃciency, supported by ACE; this drove the take-up of insulation
measures across the country (I1, I14, I15, I26). In 2002, during early
take-oﬀ, WWF-UK’s ‘One Million Sustainable Homes’ campaign called
for the government to make a public commitment to develop a million
‘sustainable homes’ (including retroﬁtting the existing stock and
building new homes) [37] and to enable the practice to become stan-
dard by 2012 [70]. Its role was unique from other environmental
groups in the UK, because WWF had an insider role with the govern-
ment and industry [71,45]. WWF eﬀectively acted as an intermediary
taking on extensive networking, learning and visioning activities. It was
the only NGO in the Sustainable Buildings Task Force, and carried out
audits on the sustainability progress of twelve large building ﬁrms
([45]: 340). Importantly, its One Million Sustainable Homes campaign
created a vision towards forthcoming policy design.
Other types of actors, also, became intermediaries for low-energy
homes during late predevelopment. Bioregional, established in 1994 as a
social enterprise for environmental sustainability, became interested in
sustainable buildings in 1997. Initially considering building a new of-
ﬁce space, Bioregional completed a multi-purpose BedZED develop-
ment in 2002 (I19). BedZED became one of the most famous sustainable
housing developments in the UK, receiving media attention and public
interest [7]. Bioregional completed a more commercial sustainable
building project, One Brighton, in 2010 [50].
Some social housing associations have also intermediated for low-
energy homes. They were particularly active in the 1980s and 1990s,
perceiving that accommodation should be as energy eﬃcient as possible
for people on low incomes (I25). Housing associations have tended to
“be much more forward-looking on behalf of their residents, than speculative
house builders” (I3). Thus, certain housing associations, such as Peabody
Trust, have acted as niche intermediaries for low-energy building.
Peabody contributed to visioning and learning in the BedZed develop-
ment, being in charge of post-occupancy monitoring [72].
4.2.4. Intermediaries ceasing to exist and changing roles
While new intermediary organisations have been set-up, they have
also been abolished. Intermediaries have also altered their roles de-
pending on (a) changes in their funding or mandate, or (b) the devel-
opment of niches, changing problem deﬁnitions within the regime or
new landscape pressures. During predevelopment and take-oﬀ, a larger
number of intermediary organisations emerged and took active roles to
advance the niche than ceased to exist, but many now exist at reduced
capacity.
State-aﬃliated intermediaries in particular have been abolished. A
decline in oil prices in the early-1980s coupled with rational choice
thinking in the government inﬂuenced the removal of ACEC in 1983,
during third predevelopment phase, despite evidence that government
programmes on energy demand reduction had worked. Over thirty
years later, in 2015, during backtracking phase, state intermediaries
EEDO and ZCH were abolished in connection to the removal of almost
all policies addressing low-energy homes.
Changing roles were evident in two ways. First, many locally es-
tablished non-state intermediaries gradually began to have national
inﬂuence. Examples include CSE expanding from Bristol-based pilots to
national policy analysis and evaluation, NEA starting out as voluntary
action by a group of students and later becoming an inﬂuential national
campaigning charity, and NEF being established as an independent
charity by MKDC and becoming a national intermediary.
Second, initially state-aﬃliated intermediaries have become more
akin to independent charities or consultancies over time. BRE was
privatised in 1997, during late predevelopment, and has since been
owned by a charitable foundation [67]. It had a signiﬁcant role in ag-
gregating and sharing knowledge, e.g. through the Energy Eﬃciency
Best Practice Programme, which diminished through privatisation (I25,
I27, I28, I29). In England, EST was initially funded through a levy on
energy bills and Energy Eﬃciency Standards of Performance [36]. The
government removed core funding from EST in 2012, during gradual
dismantling, in a bid to save money and remove quasi-autonomous non-
governmental organisations [36]. Subsequently, EST has had to apply
and compete for funding alongside other non-state intermediaries and
changed towards being a lobbyist (I26–28).
While the upsurge of policies created much space for new inter-
mediaries during late take-oﬀ, from 2006 onwards, the policy cuts
combined with landscape developments led to a curtailed operational
space for many intermediaries since 2015. Social housing funds’ re-
sources to pilot low-energy solutions have diminished, following re-
duced subsidies and new legislation pertaining to social housing (I14),
though they are still important (I28). The reduction in government
subsidies has also led to intensifying competition over funding and
mandate for some existing intermediary organisations. For those in-
termediaries dependent on membership funding, “competing for mem-
bers… has become much more acute in the last two or three years, because
until then, the big companies would actually pay for membership of lots of
organisations” (I23).
4.2.5. Evolving ecology of intermediaries
Tables 2 and 3 summarise how transition intermediaries for low-
energy homes have emerged, changed roles and abolished over time.
While some intermediaries have focused mostly on either new or ex-
isting buildings, many of them have addressed both sectors to a degree
and diﬀerently in successive phases. Many also interlink with each
other, for example, through connections via their founding bodies,
participation in network-based intermediary organisations, or con-
tribution to the same policy processes. Interviewees described both
Table 2
Summary of non-state transition intermediaries: emergence and existing organisations taking up intermediary roles.
Phase Policy Intermediation
Predevelopment (1973–1998) Sub-phases of weak or market-based
policy
• Emergence of new non-state intermediaries (CAT for new build, CSE for retroﬁt) independently
of policy but with later policy inﬂuence
• Emergence of new non-state intermediaries (AECB and NEF for new build, ACE and NEA for
retroﬁt) responding to weak policy
• Some social housing funds taking on intermediary roles to pilot low-energy concepts
Take-oﬀ/nurturing
(1999–2005)
Initiation of climate policy and vision
building for zero-carbon homes
• NGO (WWF-UK) taking on an intermediary role to lobby for new sustainable homes policy
Take-oﬀ/shielding (2006–2008) Strong policies driving zero-carbon
homes
• Emergence of new non-state intermediaries (GHA, UKGBC, mainly for new build) to bring
coherence to the niche following zero-carbon homes commitment and being critical about
current practices
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collaboration and competition to exist simultaneously (I27, I28).
Fig. 3 illustrates the ecology of intermediary organisations in four
diﬀerent phases: mid-predevelopment (1988), end of predevelopment
(1998), end of take-oﬀ (2008) and backtracking (2016). It shows how
the intermediaries position, in terms of new build and/or retroﬁt, and
connect with each other (these links are tentative and others may also
exist). Between 1988 and 2008, there was a signiﬁcant expansion of the
ecology of intermediaries. Government-initiated network organisations,
the Zero Carbon Hub in particular, coordinated stakeholder involve-
ment in policy development in 2008. Such network intermediaries,
besides their core staﬀ, have comprised other intermediary organisa-
tions and actors as members. In 2016, many of the same organisations
still existed but in reduced capacity and without the support of network
intermediaries.
As a novel contribution to research, our study shows the accumu-
lation of an increasing number of intermediaries, although some have
stopped operating over time, while others reduced their inﬂuence. It
shows in particular how state-aﬃliated intermediaries are more sus-
ceptible to abolishment or to have their support withdrawn,
particularly inﬂuenced by the prevailing policy paradigm. This in-
dicates the importance of a broader ecology of intermediaries that also
includes non-state intermediary organisations to keep suﬃcient mo-
mentum alive, even when individual intermediary organisations cease
to exist. It is also clear that intermediaries are only a part of a broad
range of actors needed for a transition (e.g. [73]).
4.3. Inﬂuence of intermediaries on low-energy homes policy
The intermediary organisations mentioned above have shaped
policy development in various ways, explicitly and implicitly. The dif-
ferent types of inﬂuence include:
1 Piloting and experimenting that demonstrate what is possible, in-
ﬂuencing political vision building and gradual tightening of policy
demands: usually carried out by non-state intermediaries (CAT, CSE,
Bioregional, AECB) but also by some state-aﬃliated intermediaries
(Innovate UK)
2 Inﬂuencing the development of standard setting and new legislation:
Table 3
Summary of state-aﬃliated transition intermediaries: emergence and existing organisations taking up intermediary roles.
Phase Policy Intermediation
Predevelopment (1973–1998) Sub-phases of strong regulation-
oriented policy
• Establishment of new state-aﬃliated intermediaries (ACEC, BRECSU, EST) to increase and transfer
energy eﬃciency knowledge
• Changing roles of government units (EEO) to take on intermediary roles to implement energy
eﬃciency policy
• Some new intermediaries (EST) initiated to formalise policy
Take-oﬀ/shielding (2006–2008) Strong policies driving zero-carbon
homes
• Establishment of new state-aﬃliated intermediaries (ZCH for new building, CCC cross-sectoral) to
design, implement and monitor policy
Backtracking (2009–2016) Dilution and removal of policies • Removing government funding from previously state set-up intermediaries (EST)• Abolishment of low-energy intermediaries (ZCH, EEDO)• Technology Strategy board carrying out a programme on retroﬁt
Fig. 3. Ecology of transition intermediaries driving energy improvements in new and existing buildings, and illustrative connections in four diﬀerent times.
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by a mix of state (BRE, EST, ZCH) and non-state intermediaries
(NEF, ACE; EST after privatisation)
3 Carrying out and coordinating assessments aggregating latest
knowledge, in support of policy development: by a mix of state-af-
ﬁliated (BRE, EST) and non-state intermediaries (CSE, UKGBC; EST
after privatisation)
4 Implementing and translating policy to practice: usually carried out
by state-aﬃliated intermediaries but sometimes sub-contracted to
non-state intermediaries (EST, NEA)
5 Creating and managing networks to lobby for new more transition-
oriented policies: by non-state intermediaries (ACE, GBC, GHA,
AECB, WWF, FoE)
6 Creating and managing public-private networks informing the gov-
ernment: state established but with public-private composition
(ACEC, ZCH, SBTG)
Table 4 shows examples of intermediary inﬂuence on national
government policy. The intermediary organisations have also inﬂu-
enced policy regionally (I27, I28). The following sub-sections illustrate
intermediary inﬂuence on policy development regarding the ﬁrst and
second types.
4.3.1. Intermediary inﬂuence through pilot projects
Pilot projects set up by non-state intermediaries, including CAT, CSE
and Bioregional, have created expectations of what is possible in new
build and retroﬁt. CAT has since the 1970s carried out pioneering
projects with long-term inﬂuence through an extensive network (I27,
I28; [50]).
The BedZED development, steered and disseminated by Bioregional
(I26, I28) inspired national government to display it as an example of
sustainable housing [43]. The project was a “focal point for policy ma-
kers, uniting otherwise disparate actors, and thereby creating further op-
portunities for innovation” ([75]: 2511). Multiple policy documents re-
ferred to it during early take-oﬀ and it informed discussions on changes
in building regulations pertaining to energy eﬃciency [75]. It also in-
ﬂuenced the planning policies of local councils [75].
Other intermediaries, such as local planning authorities and BRE
(pre-privatisation), have aggregated learning from these and other pilot
experiences, advocating best practice ([7]; I25, I27, I28, I29).
State-aﬃliated intermediaries have also had an occasional role
in piloting. MKDC’s low-energy pilots trace back to 1973. It was
especially active in 1986, during pre-development, setting up an
energy park and an energy standard that went 30% beyond building
regulations, drawing on work by BRE (I25; [39]).
In whole house retroﬁt, piloting was supported by the Technology
Strategy Board (now Innovate UK) programmes, most importantly the
Retroﬁt for the Future during 2009–2013. Only three of 45 projects
funded under the programme met the initial 80% CO2 emission re-
duction objective [68]. The programme resulted in learning that illu-
strated the challenges of whole house retroﬁt: who is coordinating
projects, how residents deal with the disruptive nature of retroﬁt works,
and whether designed energy savings materialise post-retroﬁt [68]. It
inﬂuenced the initiation of some new retroﬁt projects, and even the
formation of SME cooperatives to take on projects funded by the pro-
gramme (I11). Some projects achieved architectural awards and at-
tracted media attention [77]. However, many interviewees could not
detect longer-term impacts in terms of scaling up (I25–27).
4.3.2. Intermediary inﬂuence on standard setting and new legislation
Both state-aﬃliated and non-state intermediaries have inﬂu-
enced standard setting and legislation for low-energy homes, while
this is ultimately a government activity. Of non-state inter-
mediaries, some organisations seem more visible and inﬂuential in
policymaking than others, ACE being one such example (I24-27). In
addition, EST has had an important role, ﬁrst as a state-aﬃliated
intermediary, and then as non-state intermediary (I26, I29), in the
latter capacity being less inﬂuential than before (I27, I28).
The independent charity NEF was active in pushing for an en-
ergy-rating scheme during pre-development. Its National Home
Energy Rating (NHER) scheme for new and existing buildings was
inﬂuenced by state-aﬃliated BRE’s BREAAM standard (I25), and
developed based on R&D undertaken by state-aﬃliated MKDC [56].
NHER was one of two independent labelling schemes developed at
the time, NEF pushing the need to have a national energy rating
Table 4
Examples of intermediary inﬂuence on policy.
Sources: [74,39,42,75,40,45,76,56,68,77]; I5, I11, I16, I24, I25, I26, I27, I28.
Phase New buildings Existing buildings
Predevelopment
(1973–1998)
• Pilot projects set up by non-state intermediaries, including CAT,
created expectations of what was possible
• Energy Park by state-aﬃliated intermediary, MKDC, showcased
houses going beyond building regulations, creating further
expectations
• Voluntary National Home Energy Rating (NHER) scheme by NEF
pushed government to adopt Standard Assessment Procedure
developed by BRE
• Pilot projects set up by non-state intermediaries, including CSE and
NEA, created expectations of what was possible
• NHER by NEF addressed also existing buildings• ACE conducted a two-year campaign leading to the Home Energy
Conservation Act; NEA was important in implementing the ideas
• ACE produced reports to government on energy eﬃciency supplier
obligations
• EST involved in drafting the details of supplier obligations
Take-oﬀ (1999–2008) • Pilot projects set up by non-state intermediaries, including CAT and
Bioregional created expectations of what was possible
• BedZED (with Bioregional contribution) inﬂuenced local planning
authorities, e.g., the ‘Merton rule’ set 10% renewable energy
requirement for new developments, and was visibly referred to in
government policy documents
• WWF million sustainable homes campaign led to the set-up of
Sustainable Buildings Task Force, followed by improvement of
energy eﬃciency requirements in building regulations, a voluntary
Code for Sustainable Homes standard (inﬂuenced by BRE) and 2016
Zero-Carbon Homes target
• Intermediaries (e.g. BRE) aggregated pilot experiences to advocate
best practice
• Pilot projects set up by non-state intermediaries, including CSE,
created expectations of what was possible
• EST and ACE came together with the Combined Heat and Power
Association to discuss the approach to supplier obligations, jointly
inﬂuencing the Utilities Act
Back-tracking
(2009–2016)
• ZCH supported by GHA and AECD inﬂuenced how fabric energy
eﬃciency standard was added to building regulations
• EST set up retroﬁt pilots in social housing• Retroﬁt for the Future Programme coordinated by a state intermediary
TSB created expectations and demonstrated how whole house retroﬁts
can be carried out in practice (and its challenges)
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(I29). Initially the government encouraged both schemes [42] and
urged building societies to contemplate NHER ratings when con-
sidering mortgages [74]. However, inﬂuenced by the increasing
push to adopt an energy-rating scheme and to bring consistency to
measuring building energy consumption, the government launched
a Standard Assessment Procedure (SAP) in 1992; this followed ad-
vice from civil servants that an independent scheme like SAP is
better than the proposed alternatives ([56,42,41]; I25). Yet, some
see SAP as a stripped down version of NHER, with the same people
involved in developing NHER and SAP (I29). State-aﬃliated BRE
formulated SAP, which was updated several times and included in
building regulations in 2005 [80,55].
ACE has been very active in lobbying for new legislation (I25–27).
For example, it played an important role in the formation of the Home
Energy Conservation Act in 1995 (I26), during a two-year campaign
[40]. Later, together with EST and Combined Heat and Power Asso-
ciation, ACE inﬂuenced the process resulting in the Utilities Act, the
organisations jointly having good political inﬂuence, knowledge of
policy details and support from industry (I24, I26).
Following the WWF-UK’s ‘One Million Sustainable Homes’
campaign, during early take-oﬀ, the government established a
Sustainable Buildings Task Group (SBTG) in 2003, with a remit to
“advise the Government on practical and cost eﬀective measures to
improve the sustainability of buildings” ([81]: 6). SBTG’s members
included WWF-UK, building and construction companies, archi-
tects, social housing providers, EST, waste companies and local
authorities [81]. It produced a ‘Better buildings – better lives’ re-
port in 2004, which included recommendations to government and
industry, such as a 25% energy eﬃciency improvement in Part L of
building regulations and a national Code for Sustainable Building
(CSB) [81].
The Code was recommended to be based on BRE’s BREEAM stan-
dard, introduced already in 1990 for the non-domestic sector and ex-
tended as the Ecohomes standard for the domestic sector in 2000
[45,82,76]. SBTG recommended also a joint industry-government
venture that would develop, establish and manage the Code, helping
give a clear direction to industry [81]. A number of actors, including
UKGBC, lobbied for The Code (I28). These developments lead to the
launch of the Code for Sustainable Homes in December 2006 as a vo-
luntary standard, aiming to encourage industry to go beyond the
minimum standards of building regulations [45]. It acted as a bench-
mark for the 2016 zero carbon homes announcement and many local
authorities across the UK applied the Code in their planning require-
ments.
The Zero Carbon Hub (ZCH) had working groups aiming to de-
velop a zero-carbon deﬁnition and policy for fabric energy eﬃ-
ciency, carbon compliance (e.g. on-site low-carbon and renewable
energy) and allowable solutions (e.g. oﬀsite measures for reducing
carbon). On fabric energy eﬃciency, these aimed to encourage in-
novation in building fabric products by seeking “to set the standard
at a challenging level, yet in a way that could be achieved by a variety of
diﬀerent technical solutions” ([55]: 171). For example, AECB,
drawing on their Passivhaus approach, called for stricter fabric
energy eﬃciency standards and, with GHA, for a move to measuring
absolute energy use [55]. Another issue of debate was whether
fabric energy eﬃciency standards would require also mechanical
ventilation and heat recovery, supported by AECB but opposed by
house builders [55].
Already preceding ZCH, there was signiﬁcant debate and disagree-
ment regarding the level of on-site renewable energy and other allow-
able solutions (e.g. carbon compliance) versus fabric energy eﬃciency
[55]. Organisations, including UKGBC and WWF, supported a strict
regulatory standard for 100% on-site renewables “to encourage innova-
tion in on-site technologies”, UKGBC later changing its position ([55]:
170). However, a national housebuilding crisis gave house builders an
excuse to question already agreed fabric energy eﬃciency standards
and levels of carbon compliance on cost-basis (I7).
Eventually, the 2014 update of building regulations included a
fabric energy eﬃciency standard for the ﬁrst time. ZCH came up with
actual numbers and were inﬂuential in policy development (I16), while
EST helped particularly in ZCH work on marketing and demand sti-
mulation for zero-carbon homes (I5). However, ZCH failed to deliver an
inﬂuential standard because of house builders’ strong inﬂuence, invol-
ving people with insuﬃcient technical expertise, and leaving several
issues unresolved (I29).
The situation in 2017 was rather modest regarding intermediaries’
policy inﬂuence. A representative of an intermediary stated that: “an
awful lot of us are less eﬀective than we used to be, because membership has
dropped oﬀ in most organisations, because of funding constraints. I think
everybody’s ability to inﬂuence has been reduced, in the vast majority of
cases. It is not that particular organisations have gone. It is just that all of us
struggle more than we used to, to be a voice” (I23). Many intermediary
organisations are undergoing restructuring to survive.
5. Discussion and conclusions
We examined the long-term trajectory of the UK low-energy
homes niche, developing in the context of energy eﬃciency and
climate policy. We paid speciﬁc attention to the interplay between
policy development and the emergence and inﬂuence of transition
intermediaries. We were interested in when and why new inter-
mediary organisations had emerged or existing organisations sub-
sumed intermediary roles for low-energy homes, and what inﬂuence
these intermediary organisations have had on policy development.
Furthermore, we extended existing literature on intermediation by
illustrating empirically how the dynamic ‘ecology of inter-
mediaries’ (cf. [11]) has changed over time with respect to policy
formation, generating novel insights to literature.
5.1. Emergence of intermediary organisations and roles
First, we found that in the predevelopment phase, new non-state
transition intermediaries speciﬁcally emerged at times of weak or
market-based policy as a counter action to a lack of protective space
provided by policies. These actors initiated local action and lobbied
for policy change. This is an interesting ﬁnding partly contradicting
previous research, which has found that a stable, long-term policy
and ﬁnancial context creates a fruitful environment for inter-
mediary activities (Backhous, 2010). Our novel ﬁnding may be
explained by the lack of attention in previous research on inter-
mediaries addressing diﬀerent phases of transition.
However, we also found that, in the late take-oﬀ phase, policy
developments pertaining to zero-carbon homes (with potentially
destabilising inﬂuence for new build) improved the operational
space for non-state transition intermediaries through increasing
needs and resources to pilot, scale-up and implement policy. In this
phase, new network-type intermediaries, such as the UK Green
Building Council (UKGBC), coordinated activities to form a more
coherent niche to respond to the changing policy environment and
to further inﬂuence the formation of protective spaces and facilitate
niche acceleration. This ﬁnding supports Smith et al. [83] who in
the context of community energy observed how intermediaries try
to create a coherent voice for the niche towards policymaking.
Second, state-aﬃliated intermediaries formed – as either new
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organisations or existing organisations subsuming intermediary
functions to advance low-energy homes – when policy for building
energy eﬃciency was strong in the predevelopment and take-oﬀ
phases. Interestingly, by 2016, many such intermediaries had
ceased to exist or had transformed their role to non-state inter-
mediaries, creating a gap in the ecology of intermediaries. Instead
of what might be theoretically expected [29], many state-aﬃliated
intermediaries, such as the Energy Eﬃciency Deployment Oﬃce
(EEDO) and the Zero Carbon Hub (ZHB), disappeared before, rather
than after, niche development accelerated.
Third, non-state and state-aﬃliated intermediaries often jointly in-
ﬂuenced further policy development; interestingly even taking similar
roles in niche nurturing processes (cf. [20]). Both groups of inter-
mediaries engaged in the articulation of expectations and visions,
learning, and connecting actors, identiﬁed previously as core functions
of state-aﬃliated intermediaries by Kivimaa [10].
In terms of inﬂuence, we identiﬁed six types with illustrating
examples. For example, some intermediaries piloted new projects
that were aggregated by other intermediaries, and were acknowl-
edged in local and national policy. Speciﬁc lobby actions by non-
state intermediaries informed the development of new policies,
such as the Standard Assessment Procedure (SAP) for buildings, the
Utilities Act and the Code for Sustainable Homes. Subsequently,
state-aﬃliated intermediaries reﬁned the initial ideas for concrete
policy recommendations to be adopted by the government. Yet,
simultaneously much intermediary action existed that did not result
in concrete policy changes, linking to the complexity of inter-
mediary action and policy change identiﬁed also by Smith et al.
[83].
5.2. Insights on the ecology of intermediaries
We showed how an extensive ecology of intermediaries has
formed supporting low-energy homes niche development, and how
this ecology has changed over time with new organisations being
established and others ceasing to exist or changing roles. While this
ecology is connected through mutual aims to support the broader
low-energy goals and to destabilise the incumbent practices and
institutions maintaining the high-energy building stock, it is not a
seamlessly functioning network. Each intermediary organisation
has its own speciﬁc goals deriving from a speciﬁc ideology and
mandate, and the people and interests involved (whether public,
commercial or civil society). Intermediaries are, thus, strategic
actors [88], which leads to the ecology being divided by the speciﬁc
goals and action proposals of the diﬀerent intermediaries. Fur-
thermore, similarities may also create a need to separate rather
than unite actions, when funding is limited and the survival of the
organisation is threatened – creating a need for a diﬀerentiated,
rather than a common voice pertaining to low-energy homes.
The interconnections between the intermediaries can be long-
term, e.g. tied to their oﬃcial connections (such as between the
Centre of Alternative Technology and Centre for Sustainable Energy
as sister-organisations) or temporary, linking to ongoing policy
processes or projects. Links also form through people that move
from one organisation to another. The analysis here indicates sub-
networks forming around retroﬁt and/or new build, and around
practice-oriented or policy-oriented action. A further dimension is
national versus regional action, which is beyond the scope of this
study.
Interestingly, while take-oﬀ seemed to have halted in 2015,
several intermediaries, e.g. the Association for the Conservation of
Energy (ACE), Energy Saving Trust (EST), and the UK Green
Building Council (UKGBC), still exist and actively promote low-
energy homes. Their resources, however, have reduced, leading to
more competition over funding. The low-energy homes niche has
backtracked to a phase, where government policy does not ex-
plicitly support intermediation or further development of whole
house retroﬁts or zero-carbon new homes (while consultation is
ongoing for the former). Despite this backtracking, the ecology of
intermediaries continues to self-organise and remains committed to
accelerating the niche, but is less eﬀective than before – facing an
increasing battle for survival and creating cracks within the ecology
of intermediaries.
5.3. Prospects and needs for further research
For environmental governance more generally, our research
raises interesting questions. For example, with increasing attention
given to polycentric governance (cf. [5]), there is also a need for
intermediaries to connect diﬀerent spheres of governance. The
same applies for accelerating momentum for experimentation in
climate governance (cf. [84]), where intermediaries are needed to
connect experiments and aggregate lessons. Yet, as our ﬁndings
show, while changed policy can curtail intermediary opportunities
(even at the absence of direct ﬁnancial or political dependence on
the government), it remains open who supports these inter-
mediaries that are needed in fragmented governance settings, and
how they obtain their resources to operate.
This work supports the existing literature [28,90] that has re-
cognised intermediaries as a policy tool in relation to Strategic
Niche Management. This means that governments can support the
future progression of niches into more sustainable directions by
allowing such intermediary actors to exist and thrive. Yet, inter-
mediaries are struggling due to limited resources and a rapidly
changing policy context, the latter requiring repacking “their ac-
tivities for each new policy change and funding opportunity” ([85]: 40).
The changing environmental governance landscape and the ques-
tions posed above show a need for further research on the roles that
intermediary actors can play in governance for sustainability
transitions. In addition, further research is needed on the dynamics
of policy and transition intermediaries, in particular how inter-
mediaries for the existing regime work to counter the actions of
transition intermediaries.
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